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Writing with Light: The Metaphysics of
the Copyright Process in the Betamax
Cases
by DAVID C. FARMER*
I
Introduction
[C]opyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases be-
longing to forensic discussions, to what may be called the meta-
physics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may
be, very subtle and refined, and, sometimes, almost
evanescent.1
On January 17, 1984, the United States Supreme Court in
Sony Corp. v. Universal Studios, Inc.2 (Betamax III) finally set-
tled a question unresolved in the federal courts since 1976:3
does the sale of videotape recorders (VTRs) constitute contrib-
utory infringement of television and motion picture producers'
copyrights? By answering the question in the negative, the
Court left Congress several options: Congress can implicitly
agree with the Court's interpretation of the Copyright Act4 by
* Member Third Year Class, William S. Richardson School of Law, University
of Hawaii at Manoa; B.A., University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1970; M.A., University of
Hawaii at Manoa, 1973. This paper has been awarded First Prize for the William S.
Richardson School of Law, University of Hawaii at Manoa by the 1984 Nathan Burkan
Memorial Competition, sponsored by the American Society of Composers, Authors
and Publishers.
1. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.).
2. 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
3. The first action was filed November 11, 1976, decided October 2, 1979, and
amended December 5, 1979. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp., 480 F. Supp.
429 (C.D. Cal. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Betamax Il. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed. Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp., 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Betamax II]. The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of
the circuit court and upheld the judgment of the district court. Sony Corp. v. Univer-
sal City Studios, Inc., 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Betamax III].
4. Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. (1983) (originally enacted as Copyright Revi-
sion Act of Oct. 19, 1976, 90 Stat. 2541). The courts below also based their decisions in
part on the Copyright Act of March 4, 1909, 35 Stat. 1075 (amended 1976), since some
of the alleged infringements had occurred before enactment of the revised Act.
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doing nothing; Congress can explicitly affirm the decision by
amending the Act to exempt home videotaping from copyright
infringement; or Congress can overrule the decision by impos-
ing mandatory royalties on the sale of VTRs, blank recording
tape, or both, to be shared by the holders of the copyrights.
The appropriate response of Congress, as this note suggests,
would be to do nothing.
The Betamax litigation not only resolves the issue of whether
the sale and use of VTRs constitute contributory or direct copy-
right infringement but also illustrates the effect of developing
technology on the fundamental nature of the copyright process
and the costs of misunderstanding that process. This note ar-
gues that the plaintiff television and film producers in the
Betamax cases erred by seeking to stake their copyright claims
in the courts. Two difficulties pervaded the Betamax litigation:
the speculative nature of plaintiffs' harm and the difficulty of
fashioning a remedy.5 This note suggests that copyright protec-
tion is essentially a three-stage process: the initial establish-
ment of marketplace controls to commercially exploit a new
technology;6 subsequent legislative endorsement of the market-
place mechanisms;7 and, only finally, judicial enforcement of
established rights.' Under this view, successful protection de-
mands a creative response to the opportunities created at each
stage of the copyright process. Had plaintiffs sought protection
in the marketplace, they might have forged a mechanism, sanc-
tioned by Congress and enforced by the courts, by which to in-
sure a fair return on their products. Plaintiffs lost not only the
litigation battle but also an opportunity to fashion a solution to
a problem created by unprecedented technology at an early
stage of its development.
II
Copyright Protection
A. The Initial Problem: Failure in the Marketplace
As the district court stated in its findings of fact, various the-
atrical and television markets generate revenues for television
5. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 39-65 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 66-76 and accompanying text.
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and film productions.9 The original release of a film to theaters
produces initial box office receipts, with subsequent licensing
to network or pay television generating further revenues. 10
Syndication to local television stations, rental to consumers,
and the sale of prerecorded videodiscs constitute the remaining
markets for the distribution of theatrical films." Made-for-tel-
evision productions are licensed for first exhibition, for rerun
on late night and daytime network television, and for syndica-
tion.12 However, the cost of production, as well as profits, is
recovered only after the first run, since license fees do not ordi-
narily cover the cost of production of a series.' 3
Copyright law has traditionally provided the legal mecha-
nism that protects the producers' work from unauthorized ex-
ploitation by commercially motivated interests. 4 Should
unauthorized copies be made, circulated, and exhibited for
profit, producers may obtain statutory injunctive relief and
damages to prevent further exploitation and to compensate for
their loss.' 5
Into this well-established marketplace structure entered
videotape recorders in the mid-1960s. 16 With the wide accessi-
bility of this technology by the mid-1970s, consumers could
copy and preserve from their home televisions a full range of
theatrical and made-for-television productions protected by
copyright.' This unprecedented capability created a crisis in
the motion picture and television production industries, which
viewed with alarm the possibility of unfettered use of their
9. Betamax I, 480 F. Supp. at 433-35.
10. Id. at 433.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 434.
13. Id.
14. See generally M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT (1984).
15. Id.
16. 480 F. Supp. at 435-36.
17. Sony introduced its half-inch Betamax format in 1975. Shyles, The Video
Tape Recorder: Crown Prince of Home Video Devices, FEED BACK, Winter 1981, at 1-5.
By 1979, sales of VTRs reached one million. RCA Predicting $1 Bil Retail Year for
VCR Industry, Variety, May 13, 1981, at 1. By 1981, sales passed the three million a
year mark. Cook, High Tech: New Video Cassettes, EMMY, Summer 1980, at 40-44. By
1982, VTRs were in five million households. An estimated 35 million households will
have VTRs by 1988. The Video Revolution, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 6, 1984, at 50-57. In 1963,
a record 4.1 million videocassette recorders (VCRs) were sold in the United States;
sales for 1984 are projected to exceed 7 million. VCRs: Coming on Strong, TIME, Dec.
24, 1984, at 45.
No. 1]
COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 7
products without any additional compensation. 18 Rather than
attempting to achieve an accommodation with the new technol-
ogy in the marketplace, two major production companies
sought to vindicate their position by recourse to the courts in
1976.19
The precise nature of the harm suffered by these industries
has never been clearly defined or even established.20 Arguably,
the fact that more people are able to watch a production ap-
pears to be a positive advantage to all. A program expected to
garner a large audience, either in real time or later on video-
tape, will demand a higher licensing fee.21 Networks sell adver-
tising on the basis of projected rather than actual audience
numbers, although the ratings services can measure the video-
tape audience at least as accurately as they can the original
one.22 In addition, since the producers license their films on a
contracted flat-rate basis,23 the number of potential viewers is
significant at the initial negotiation stage with the networks.
Therefore, even without videotaping, the compensation paid to
producers is independent of the actual number of viewers fi-
nally seeing the program.
Moreover, should the existing marketplace mechanism prove
unprofitable, producers exercise control over alternative mar-
kets where the numbers of viewers translate directly into reve-
18. For the impact on broadcast television, see L. GROSS, THE NEW TELEVISION
TECHNOLOGIES 94-95. For the impact on the film industry, see id. at 95-96. See also
The Video Revolution, supra note 17, at 56-57 and 52-54. Apparently film industry
concern about the technology's impact on theater attendance has been misplaced.
Box office receipts from 1984 are expected to reach $4 billion, an increase from $3.5
billion in 1982 and $3.8 billion in 1983. VCRs: Coming on Strong, supra note 17, at 50.
Moreover, the ancillary market of home video accounted for 14% of studio revenue in
1983 and is expected to reach 16% by 1988. The Competition Looks On, TIME, Dec. 24,
1984, at 53. Similarly, VCRs may actually be encouraging viewers to watch more
network television. Id
19. See supra note 3.
20. As the district court pointed out, the issue of harm suffered is important for
three reasons. It determines: (1) whether home videotaping is fair use, (2) whether
injunctive relief is appropriate, and (3) assuming infringement has occurred, what the
damages are. See Betamax 1, 480 F. Supp. at 451.
21. For a discussion of the broadcasting industry and the mechanism and effect of
the ratings services, see id.. at 440-41. The district court found that "the larger the
audience for the original telecast, the higher price plaintiffs can demand from broad-
casters from rerun rights .... In any event, if ratings can reflect Betamax recording,
original audiences may increase and, given market practices, this should aid plaintiffs
rather than harm them." Id. at 468, quoted with approval in Betamax III, 104 S. Ct.
794 n.38. See also supra note 18 and infra note 223.
22. Betamax 1, 480 F. Supp. at 468.
23. Id.
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nues. Walt Disney Studios has consistently profited by the
practice of holding classic films out of circulation for a number
of years and then re-releasing them to a new generation of
theater-goers whose numbers translate directly into revenues. 4
The development of videodiscs, cassettes, and tapes also offers
producers an effective bottleneck mechanism to control access
to their products on a per capita basis, since each copy is paid
for by an individual purchaser.
Thus, judicious selection of alternative market "windows, 25
coupled with the predictable impact of home recording, argua-
bly provides producers with enough flexibility to be fully able
to control the return from their productions.
Even if these marketing strategies prove ineffective to con-
trol and exploit the home videotaping technology, other market
alternatives created by private contractual agreements offer
possible solutions.26  For example, private sector mechanisms
such as performing-rights organizations and collecting socie-
ties27 might provide the most effective and economical means
for copyright owners to protect their interests through private
negotiations with hardware and tape manufacturers. Since
1941, the blanket license system has been challenged on the ba-
24. For a complete description of the Disney talent for exploiting technological
innovations of all kinds, including calculated re-releases of classic films, see R.
SCHICKEL, THE DISNEY VERSION 19-29 (1968). See also Thomas, There's Gold in Movie
Oldies, The Honolulu Star-Bull. and Advertiser, Sept. 16, 1984, at C-12, col. 1, for a
description of the Disney re-release of its classics every six or seven years in the con-
text of what has become an expanding industry practice.
25. "Windows" is an industry term that describes the various marketing segments
available to producers, i.e., theatrical release, videocassette, cable, network television.
See generally Turan, Two Porcupines About to Embrace, TV GUIDE, July 14, 1984, at
37.
26. Compulsory licensing will, to be sure, eliminate transaction delays. Yet,
other means exist for achieving the same result without intruding so deeply
into market processes. The photocopying question, which is similarly compli-
cated by the problem of transaction delays, was resolved without resort to
compulsory licensing. Presumably publishers and photocopiers will negoti-
ate blanket licenses through clearing house mechanisms similar to those used
by ASCAP and BMI or will adopt still untried means for reducing transac-
tion costs.
Goldstein, Preempted State Doctrines, Involuntary Transfers and Compulsory
Licenses: Testing the Limits of Copyright, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1107, 1138 (1977) (foot-
notes omitted).
27. Collecting societies monitor the use of copyright-protected material of their
members and collect royalty fees for distribution to the copyright holders. For an
overview of the history and function of private United States collecting societies in
the music industry such as ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC, see S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOV-
SKY, THIS BUSINESS OF MUSIC 157-72 (4th ed. 1979).
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sis of alleged antitrust violations;2" nevertheless, blanket licens-
ing of composers', authors', and publishers' copyrights was
ultimately vindicated by numerous consent decrees and by a re-
cent Supreme Court decision.29 Even without resort to collect-
ing societies for television and motion picture producers,
private contractual agreements between the video technology
industries and the motion picture and television production in-
dustries may prove to be the most durable and satisfactory solu-
tion3 0 to a problem that has been ineffectively addressed by our
legislative and judicial institutions: the method by which crea-
tive artists can best receive just compensation.3 '
B. The Copyright Process
1. The Technology in the Marketplace
Numerous scholars have stressed the structural limitations
of copyright law, traceable to its origin in printing press tech-
nology.3 2 For example, under traditional copyright law, to copy
28. Garner, United States v. ASCAP: The Licensing Provisions of the Amended
Final Judgment of 1950, 23 BuLL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 119 (1976); Timberg, The Anti-
trust Aspects of Merchandising Modern Music: The ASCAP Consent Judgment of
1950,19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 294 (1954); Note, CBS v. ASCAP: Performing Rights
Societies and the Per Se Rule, 87 YALE L.J. 783 (1978). The most recent cases treating
the issue of whether blanket licensing constitutes per se illegal price fixing in viola-
tion of the Sherman Antitrust Act are: CBS v. ASCAP, 400 F. Supp. 77 (1975) (no per
se violation); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 562 F.2d 130 (1977) (per se violation); and
CBS v. ASCAP, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (no violation).
29. CBS v. ASCAP, 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
30. Finally, on a very practical level, not all of the law of literary, musical,
film and stage property is determined in the legislature and the courts. Much
of it is to be found in the basic industrywide agreements, collective bargain-
ing or otherwise, such as between the League of New York Theatres and the
Society of Stage Directors and Choreographers, and between the Association
of Motion Picture and Television Producers and the Writers Guild of
America. Moreover, these agreements change from time to time. These
changes may shift ownership, or control, or financial participation, in certain
rights under copyright. Accordingly, when working on a contract which is
subject to one of these collective agreements, one must review it, and then
when the problem arises, as is likely, such as the use in a motion picture of
the stage director's stage directions, the problem will be familiar and will not
seem so new.
Rothenberg, Some New Problems in Motion Picture Copyright Law, 21 BULL. Copy-
RIGHT Soc'Y 214, 219 (1974).
31. See infra. 221-23 and accompanying text.
32. See, e.g., M. McLuHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN
(1964); I. POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 214 (1983). The genesis of copyright law
in printing technology and the changing of copyright law in response to new technol-
ogy is traced in the majority opinion in Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 782-83.
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a text in writing is a violation, while to read the text is not.3
With computer texts, the distinction is reversed. To read a
text, one "writes" it on the screen. To transmit it to others does
not involve writing, only a password-activated access to the
computer's memory: "[o]ne must write to read, but not to
write. ' 34 Thus, a copyright law that only protects unauthorized
duplication of a text may not be adequate to protect the inter-
ests of the creator of intellectual property.
To illustrate why print-based concepts of copyright are not
appropriate to electronic technology, Professor Pool cites a re-
cent example.3 5 The Board of Cooperative Educational Serv-
ices (BOCES) of Erie County, New York had collected a library
of television programs taped off the air for classroom use.
Upon learning of the practice, Encyclopaedia Britannica's edu-
cational film division initiated litigation to stop alleged copy-
right violation by BOCES.' The court granted an injunction
based on the finding that the practice was not fair use, even if
not for profit and for use only within the county's schools. 7
Although the company was able to enforce its copyright by
pursuing traditionally effective remedies, it ultimately may
have lost an important opportunity. The futility of attempting
to stop such taping by teachers and students, coupled with the
fact that service organizations like BOCES created a natural
bottleneck from which to collect fees from a primary market,
suggests that the film company's best interests might have been
served by embracing, rather than destroying, such service orga-
nizations.3s Had Encyclopaedia Britannica worked out a negoti-
ated relationship with BOCES whereby the taping was
sanctioned in return for royalty fees, the use of its product
could have been controlled and exploited. Instead, it achieved a
hollow victory, since removal of BOCES very probably en-
couraged the unmanageable exploitation of the films by indi-
vidual students and teachers.
33. See generally M. NIMMER, supra note 14.
34. I. POOL, supra note 32, at 214.
35. Id. at 215-16.
36. Encyclopaedia Britannica v. Crooks, 447 F. Supp. 243 (W.D.N.Y. 1978). See
also Oler, Copyright Law and the Fair Use of Visual Images, in FAIR USE AND FREE
INQUIRY: COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE NEW MEDIA 268-86 (J. Lawrence & B. Timberg ed.
1980).
37. Encyclopaedia Britannica, 447 F. Supp. at 249-53.
38. I. POOL, supra note 32, at 216.
No. 1]
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2. The Legislative Component
As has been widely recognized, "[c]opyright was a specific ad-
aptation to a specific technology. '39 The printing press pro-
vided an efficient bottleneck mechanism through which copies
could be controlled and monitored.4" Consequently, the some-
what restrictive concept of "writings" impeded the extension of
protection to new technologies.4 In the United States, pursu-
ant to its constitutional mandate,42 the First Congress passed
"[a]n Act for the encouragement of learning" 43 in order to give
an author "the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting,
publishing and vending ... [his] map, chart, book or books. 44
Gradually, however, through a process of amendments and
complete revisions, congressional response to technological de-
velopment has been to bring within copyright protection such
new media as prints,45 photographs,46 and motion pictures.
The comprehensive revision of 1976 expanded the scope of fed-
eral copyright protection to include any "original works of au-
thorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed ... [including] motion pictures and
other audiovisual works. '48 The constitutional rationale for af-
fording a limited, property-like interest to authors is that it en-
courages creation and dissemination of new intellectual
expression for the public good.49 Throughout its history, the
39. Id. at 17. The fact was also noted by both the majority and minority in
Betamax III. 104 S. Ct. at 783 n.12 (citing B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPY-
RIGHT vii-viii (1966)) (majority opinion); id. at 798 (dissenting opinion). For excellent
treatments of the relevant history, see Fenning, Copyright: History and Development,
28 CALIF. L. REv. 620 (1940), and Comment, The Origin of the Patent and Copyright
Clause of the Constitution, 17 GEO. L.J. 109 (1929).
40. I. POOL, supra note 32, at 16-17.
41. Id. at 17.
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8: "The Congress shall have Power ... [t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .
43. Act of May 31, 1790, 1st Cong., 2d Sess., 1 Stat. 124.
44. Id. § 1.
45. Act of Apr. 29, 1802, 7th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 Stat. 171.
46. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, 38th Cong., 2d Sess., 13 Stat. 540.
47. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, 62d Cong., 2d Sess., 37 Stat. 488.
48. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1983).
49. Kaplan clearly points out the realities which copyright protection has afforded
since its inception in England in the 16th century, "I have spoken of encouraging 'cre-
ation' as well as 'dissemination,' but copyright has evidently more to do today with
mobilizing the profit-propelled apparatus of dissemination-publication and distribu-
tion-than with calling the signals into first unpublished existence; the latter process
must be to a considerable extent self-generated." B. KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 75.
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protection offered by copyright law of the property-like inter-
ests of authors and their representatives has been at odds with
the public interest in access to ideas.5 0
In responding to technological change in copyright legisla-
tion, Congress has reacted rather than taken the initiative.5'
Since Congress was clearly aware of the advent of the technol-
ogy,5" its inaction cannot be attributed to ignorance. Sony
VTRs were available as early as 1965, and by 1976 the technol-
ogy was pervasive enough to prompt the Betamax litigation.53
As the legislative history of the 1976 Act demonstrates,54 Con-
50. Professor Seltzer not only disagrees with this formulation, but his entire the-
sis of productive versus intrinsic use in regard to the fair use doctrine is predicated on
the view that the copyright scheme completely incorporates and balances this tension
within its structure. To again balance these interests outside the statutory frame-
work is to fall prey to conceptual error. See L. SELTZER, EXEMPTIONS AND FAIR USE
IN COPYRIGHT: THE ExCLuSIvE RIGHTS TENSIONS IN THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT 3-17
(1978). Unfortunately, just as Seltzer's fair use analysis ultimately fails as a too-rigid
oversimplification of the flexible principles of equity at the heart of the doctrine, so
his thesis that "the copyright scheme, once a work is brought within its scope, is not
thenceforward concerned with the internal reallocation of costs between creators and
users," id. at 16 (emphasis in original), is similarly rigid and ultimately unsubstanti-
ated. Indeed, his formulation hangs by an extremely thin thread. After acknowledg-
ing the dearth of historical material addressing the issue, Seltzer cites "James
Madison, who alone among the framers of the Constitution [had] anything to say
about copyright, [although] very little, [but who] deals with it concisely in The Feder-
alist: 'The public good fully.., coincides with the claims of individuals.' [Emphasis
added.]" Id. at 10, quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 43 (J. Madison). On this authority
rests much of Seltzer's arguments in favor of full protection for copyright owners.
51. Congress's reactive posture may be contrasted with that of other nations' leg-
islatures, which have demonstrated greater initiative. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 818
n.51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The German royalty statute of 1965 places a
mandatory tax on the sale of equipment to generate revenue for royalties and was
prompted by decisions by the German Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgericthshof) in
May and June of 1955. Austria's Federal Act on Copyright in Works of Literature and
Art and Related Rights added § 42(5)-(7) in 1980, making Austria the first nation to
impose a tax on blank audio recording tape. The maximum tax per tape is about 8.3
cents. The tax on audio tapes was made effective January 1, 1981; the provision relat-
ing to blank videocassettes became effective in July 1982. The royalties are collected
by special collecting societies and are then divided among the authors, performers,
and producers of the recordings. The Federal Republic of Germany's Act dealing
with Copyright and Related Rights (1965) imposed a royalty on the sale of tape re-
cording equipment. A five percent tax is levied and then distributed through ZPU, a
joint collecting society representing the interests of composers, writers, performers,
and producers. UNESCO, COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1982);
Weimann, Private Home Taping Under Sec. 53(5) of the German Copyright Act of
1965, 30 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y 153 (1982); Kiaver, The Legal Problems of Video-Cassettes
and Audio-Visual Discs, 23 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 152, 168, 173-74 (1976).
52. Betamax I, 480 F. Supp. at 435.
53. Id. at 432.
54. The complete record of the more than 20-year process is collected in the 17
volume OMNIBUS COPYRIGHT REVISION LEGISLATIVE HISTORY (G. Grossman ed. 1976-
120 COMM/ENT L. J. [Vol. 7
gress recognized that the issue of fair use and home taping re-
quired further study by the Register of Copyrights.5 5
Moreover, the creation of the Copyright Royalty Tribunal5 6 in
the 1976 Act provided a potential mechanism for reviewing and
adjusting statutory royalty rates for use of copyrighted materi-
als pursuant to any compulsory royalty scheme Congress might
create. Bills have been introduced in Congress 8 in response
to the various court decisions, but none has become law. It
seems fair to surmise that one reason the Supreme Court in-
dulged in the extended deliberation prior to its decision in
Betamax III was to provide Congress the time and incentive to
speak.59 Indeed, the fact that almost seventy years elapsed
before the 1909 Copyright Law was comprehensively revised il-
1977), which contains all the material generated between the time when studies were
initiated in the House in July 1955 and final adoption of the revised Act in 1976. In-
cluded are the Copyright Law Revision Studies, committee reports, draft bills, tran-
scripts of hearings, and final reports by both the House and Senate. Materials relating
to the specific issue of the developing technology and copyright law are collected in
the five volumes of COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC RECORD (N.
Henry ed. 1980).
55. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 72 (1976).
56. 17 U.S.C. ch. 8 (1982).
57. Brylawski, The Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1265 (1977);
Schaffer, Are the Compulsory License Provisions of the Copyright Law Unconstitu-
tional?, 2 COM. & L. 1 (1980) (arguing compulsory royalties violate the exclusive
rights of authors).
58. See, e.g., S. 1758, 97th Cong., 1st Sess., 127 CONG. REC. 810-11 (daily ed. Oct. 21,
1981). Similar legislation was introduced by Congressmen John J. Duncan (R. Tenn.)
in H.R. 4783, Stanford E. Parris (R. Va.) in H.R. 4808, and Thomas S. Foley (D. Wash.)
in H.R. 5250. Representative Parris also offered as an alternative H.R. 4794, amending
section 107 of the 1976 Act to specify home taping as fair use. Amendment No. 1242 to
S. 1758 was subsequently proposed by Senators Charles Mathias (R. Md.), Robert
Byrd (D. W.Va.), Howard Baker (R. Tenn.), and Alan Cranston (D. Cal.) as a compro-
mise between the public's right of access and the copyright owners' right to compensa-
tion. The amendment directed the Copyright Royal Tribunal to develop a scheme to
compensate copyright owners by way of a compulsory licensing mechanism. During
the following year, the 97th Congress continued to hold hearings on the various bills,
attempting to resolve the issue of home taping of copyrighted works. At the time the
Betamax III decision was handed down, no bill had been enacted. After the decision
was handed down, Senator Charles Mathias (R. Md.) and Representative Don Ed-
wards (R. Cal.) sponsored bills imposing mandatory royalties, while Representatives
Thomas Foley (D. Wash.) and Robert Kastenmeir (D. Wis.) along with 140 cosponsors
supported a counterproposal essentially writing into the 1976 Act the Betamax III
decision. Home Tape-Recording of TV Shows Is Approved 5-4 by Supreme Court, Wall
St. J., Jan. 18, 1984, at 3, col. 1.
59. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAw FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 16-30 (1982),
for a discussion of the use and abuse of the "passive virtues" in the area of constitu-
tional adjudication. The term belongs to Alexander Bickel. A. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
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lustrates the kind of legislative conservatism characteristic of
American copyright law.60 Begun in 1955, the most recent revi-
sion took twenty-one years to complete.
Congressional performance in the development of interna-
tional copyright law parallels Congress's essentially reactive
and conservative posture in the domestic areas."' For the first
one hundred years after the first Copyright Act of 1790, only
works published by citizens and residents of the United States
could receive copyright protection.2 Even after the passage of
the so-called International Copyright Act of 1891,63 a foreign
national could receive copyright protection only if the book,
photograph, or print was manufactured or produced in the
United States.' Even the 1909 Act, in effect until the 1976 revi-
sion, retained domestic manufacture as a requirement for the
copyright protection of books and periodicals in the English
language.6 5
On both the domestic and international fronts, congressional
conservatism and timidity have been the rule rather than the
exception in addressing the major issues in copyright law.
60. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
61. Barbara Ringer, then Assistant Register and later Register of Copyrights of
the United States Copyright Office, criticized as inadequate the early reactions of
American foreign policy planners to the development of international copyright.
Writing in 1968, Professor Ringer characterized the situation as follows:
Until the Second World War the United States had little reason to take pride
in its international copyright relations; in fact, it had a great deal to be
ashamed of. With few exceptions its role in international copyright was
marked by intellectual shortsightedness, political isolationism, and narrow
economic self-interest.
Ringer, The Role of the United States in International Copyright-Past, Present, and
Future, 56 GEO. L.J. 1050, 1051 (1968).
62. Id. at 1054. Charles Dickens, a celebrated critic of the fact that American
copyright law unjustly denied foreign writers fair compensation, spoke out against the
law during his lecture tours in this country and advocated the controversial measure
of enacting a truly international copyright law. See E. JOHNSON, CHARLES DICKENS:
His TRAGEDY AND TRIUMPH 375-76, 380-81, 419-21, 449-51, 1074 (1952). Although Mr.
Bumble asserted that "the law is a ass-a idiot" in reaction to another legal folly, the
remark is apposite here. See C. DICKENS, OLIVER TWIST, ch. LI, at 389 (1846).
63. Act of Mar. 30, 1891, 51st Cong., 2d Sess., 26 Stat. 1106.
64. Ringer, supra note 61, at 1055-57.
65. Id. at 1057-58. Subsequent amendments further liberalized the manufacturing
requirements somewhat. Id. at 1058 n.53. For the suggestion that congressional iner-
tia may be attributable to the current popularist climate of "consumer politics," see
Stewart, International Copyright in the 1980's, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 351, 369-70
(1981).
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3. The Judicial Component
In order to respond to the specific issues of infringement or
fair use which technology inevitably raised, the courts, begin-
ning with Justice Story in the nineteenth century as the princi-
pal Supreme Court architect, developed the equitable doctrine
of fair use.66 Story first articulated the doctrine that permits
limited use of copyright-protected material in Folsom v.
Marsh.67 The Supreme Court has not only applied the doctrine
to reach the traditional authorship issue of what constitutes
plagiarism,6 but also, on at least one occasion, has considered
its applicability to a new medium. In White-Smith Music Pub-
lishing Co. v. Apollo Co.,69 the Court held that player piano mu-
sic rolls did not infringe on the copyright of the composer,70 a
holding which was subsequently codified as an amendment to
the copyright law.7' Viewed together with the decision in
Betamax III, White-Smith illustrates that the application of the
copyright law in response to technological change has devel-
oped within a common law tradition, guided by the general
66. See M. NIMMER, supra note 14; see also infra note 67.
67. 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). Not coincidentally, Story was the
author of the classic nineteenth century treatise on equitable principles. J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON EQuITY JUSIRPRUDENCE AS ADMINISTERED IN ENGLAND AND
AMERICA (1835). The term "fair use" first entered case law in Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F.
Cas. 26, 60 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136). Kaplan's survey of the development and
application of the doctrine remains a classic. B. KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 27-78. Selt-
zer's work, on the other hand, is long on partisan advocacy and short on history in the
context of interpreting the 1976 Act. Besides his frequent citation of Nimmer as au-
thority for his views, Seltzer cites Kaplan approvingly in three notes. L. SELTZER,
supra note 50, at 18-48. For further discussion of fair use, see Miller, Fair Use, 15 S.
CAL. L. REV. 249 (1942); Rosenfield, The Constitutional Dimension of "Fair Use" in
Copyright Law, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 790 (1975); Schulman, Fair Use and the Revi-
sion of the Copyright Act, 53 IOWA L. REV. 832 (1968); Yankwich, What is Fair Use?,
22 U. CHI. L. REV. 203 (1954).
68. The very first Supreme Court copyright case dealt with the issue of plagia-
rism. Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). The parties were both early
Supreme Court reporters. Wheaton brought suit against Peters, alleging the latter's
plagiarism of the former's copyrighted reports. The Court, per Justice McLean, re-
manded the case to the circuit court to determine if Wheaton had fully complied with
the statutory requirements of the first Copyright Act in securing protection for his
editorial headnotes only. No copyright was deemed obtainable, however, in the writ-
ten opinions delivered by the Court.
69. 209 U.S. 1 (1908). For a detailed discussion of the case, see infra notes 203-06
and accompanying text.
70. The majority in Betamax III cited the case for the proposition that "the law
has never recognized an author's right to absolute control of his work." 104 S. Ct. at
784 n.13.
71. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1964).
No. 1] COPYRIGHT PROCESS IN BETAMAX
statutory parameters provided by Congress.72
The comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act in 1976
codified the traditional fair use factors: the purpose and nature
of the use, the character of the copyrighted work, the amount
copied, and the effect of the use on potential markets.7' By this
codification, Congress clearly endorsed exceptions to copyright
protection for critical, educational, scholarly, and journalistic
uses. In addition, through this statutory authority, Congress
opened the door to application of the doctrine to unforeseen
future uses created by developing technology.
Aside from the fact that the Constitution allocates to Con-
gress the power to grant copyright protection for only limited
periods of time,74 other factors limit the courts' usefulness as
problem-solvers of copyright issues raised by technological de-
velopment. The Betamax litigation consumed almost eleven
years and considerable resources before reaching a conclusion
unsatisfactory to the holders of copyrights. Although the sub-
mission of forty-eight amicus briefs75 might suggest that the
Court's qualifications to make findings of empirical fact are at
72. Kaplan's remarks making the same point regarding the prior, 1909 Copyright
Act might apply a fortiori to the 1976 Act:
I do not mean to reproach the draftsmen for failing to face squarely the ques-
tions of validity and infringement which are in the end insoluble. Rather I
make the point that the statute, like its predecessors, leaves the development
of fundamentals to the judges. Indeed the courts have had to be consulted at
nearly every point, for the text of the statute has a maddeningly casual pro-
lixity and imprecision throughout.
B. KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 40.
73. § 107. Limitations on exclusive rights: Fair use
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted
work, including such use by reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any
other means specified by that section, for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining
whether the use made of a work in any particular case is a fair use the factors
to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of
a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1983).
74. See supra note 42.
75. Thirty-three supported the petitioners and 15 argued on behalf of respondents
(available on LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
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least as high as those of Congress, good arguments exist that
this is not necessarily true.76 Deciding what the best mecha-
nism is to facilitate creativity while preserving the public's wid-
est possible access to information involves decision-making
under extremely uncertain conditions. Moreover, a key issue
in the Betamax cases was whether plaintiff producers had in
fact suffered any harm by home taping. That they could point
only to possible future injury imposed upon them the burden of
having to endure a practice long enough to be damaged in order
to be granted relief. Even more basic, the fact that litigation is
a zero sum game severely limits its utility, especially when a
marketplace at least offers a chance of both sides winning
something instead of the inescapable winner/loser reality of a
law suit. As a practical matter, the judicial solution plainly has





After a three-year trial, the United States district court de-
clined in Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.77 (Betamax
1) to grant plaintiff copyright owners any of the relief they
sought from Sony Corporation. Plaintiffs had alleged that the
individual owners of Betamax VTRs infringed their copyrights
by making home recordings of commercially sponsored televi-
sion productions. Plaintiffs Universal City Studios and Walt
Disney Productions also sued four retailers who had sold the
Betamax and had recorded programs off the air to demonstrate
the machine's capabilities. The advertising agency marketing
the Betamax was also named as a defendant, as well as an indi-
vidual home owner and user from whom plaintiffs sought no
76. Indeed, the entire doctrine behind the rational basis review of socio-economic
legislation under equal protection challenges is the notion that the judiciary should
defer to the legislative fact-finding and democratic process which is Congress's unique
institutional role. See generally Bice, Rationality Analysis in Constitutional Law, 65
MINN. L. REV. 1, 4 (1980); Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreward: In
Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protec-
tion, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 21 (1972). For an argument in favor of judicial review based
on assessing the empirical data which informed legislative decisions, see Shuman, De-
cision-Making Under Conditions of Uncertainty, 67 JUDICATURE 326 (1984).
77. 480 F. Supp. at 429.
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relief.78  The thorough, forty-two page opinion by District
Judge Ferguson inspired a flood of controversial commentary
indicative of the strongly held positions on either side of the
issue.79
As the Supreme Court underscored in Betamax 111,80 the dis-
trict court decided only the narrow issue of the private home
use of the Betamax for the purposes of "time-shifting" and
"librarying.'"81 The court rendered no opinion concerning the
exchange of tapes between users, use of tapes for public per-
formance, or copying from cable television systems.8 2
In finding no infringement, the district court noted that the
material was originally broadcast free to the public, the tapes
were used for noncommercial purposes, and the activity was
78. As the court noted, the individual was a client of the plaintiffs' law firm and
agreed to be a defendant in the action with the expectation that he would not require
counsel, since neither damages nor costs would be claimed against him. Betamax I,
480 F. Supp. at 437. The fact that the alleged direct infringer was in reality a paper
tiger tends to support the suspicion that he was introduced into the litigation for the
sole purpose of bolstering plaintiff's claim that Sony was vicariously liable for a direct
infringement.
79. Indeed, critical discussion of the issues preceded the district court's final deci-
sion. For predecision arguments in favor of finding fair use, see Comment, Betamax
and Infringement of Television Copyright, 1977 DuKE L.J. 1181; Note, Betamax and
Copyright: the Home Videorecording Controversy, 28 COPYRIGHT L. SYMP. 233 (1982);
Note, Home Videorecording: Fair Use or Infringement?, 52 S. CAL. L. REV. 573 (1979).
For arguments favoring the imposition of royalties, see Note, A Man's Cassette Is His
Castle: A Home Use Exemption from Copyright Infringement?, 28 COPYRIGHT L.
SYMP. 189 (1982); Note, Copyright: Gone with the Betamax?, 8 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 45 (1978-1979). From the flood of post-decision comments, the following are
illustrative of those approving the decision: Note, The Betamax Case: Accommodating
Public Access and Economic Incentive in Copyright Law, 31 STAN. L. REV. 243 (1979);
Note, Home Videorecording and Copyright Law: The Betamax Case, 37 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1277 (1980); Comment, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corporation of
America: Application of the Fair Use Doctrine Under the United States Copyright
Acts of 1909 and 1976, 15 NEw ENG. L. REV. 661 (1980). For representative commen-
tary critical of the court's decision, see Hipsh, The Betamax Case and the Breakdown
of the Traditional Concept of Fair Use, 2 CoM. & L. 39 (1980); Marsh, Betamax and
Fair Use: A Shotgun Marriage, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 49 (1981); Note, Copyright-
Fair Use-Recording of Televised Copyrighted Works in the Home, 55 TUL. L. REV.
1295 (1981); Note, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp.: "Fair Use"Looks Differ-
ent on Videotape, 66 VA. L. REV. 1005 (1980); Note, Videotape Recorders: Copyright
Infringement?, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 695 (1981).
80. 104 S. Ct. at 780.
81. Time-shifting refers to the VTR's capability of taping a program while the
viewer is either watching another program or absent from the home in order to play it
back at a more convenient time. Typically this involves the recording, play-back, and
then erasure of the program. Librarying involves the same process, except that copies
are kept for repeated showings. Betamax I, 480 F. Supp. at 465.
82. Id. at 432-33, 442.
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conducted in the privacy of the home. 3 In addition, a first
amendment public interest in providing maximum access to in-
formation via the airwaves was also served by a finding of non-
infringement.8 4 Although the entire works were copied, the
copying was still fair use8 5 because no market for original
works was reduced and, therefore, no harm resulted. 6
The court also ruled that even if home use constituted in-
fringement, 7 Sony was not a contributory infringer, since it
had no direct involvement with the actual home videotaping,
some of which could be noninfringing8 8 The court reasoned by
analogy to the patent law "staple article of commerce" doc-
trine 9 that constructive knowledge by Sony of possible in-
fringement by consumers was not enough to hold Sony liable.
Otherwise, the theory of contributory infringement would be
expanded beyond precedent, and commerce would be severely
hampered.90 Finally, the court regarded the requested injunc-
tive relief, which would have prevented future Betamax sales
or required that the machines be made incapable of recording
copyrighted works off the air, to be unprecedented and inap-
propriate.91 If such relief were granted, the public would be de-
prived of using the Betamax for noninfringing recording of
noncopyrighted materials whose owners had in addition con-
sented to the copying. 92
83. Id. at 450-56. The court applied the four factors of the traditional fair use
analysis, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 107. See supra note 73.
84. Betamax I, 480 F. Supp. at 454 (citing CBS v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412
U.S. 94, 102 (1973)).
85. See supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text.
86. Betamax I, 480 F. Supp. at 454.
87. Infringement may be direct, contributory, or vicarious. Id. at 457-62.
88. Id. at 459-61.
89. Before its codification as part of the most recent revision of the Patent Act in
1952, the staple article of commerce doctrine developed through judicial decisions de-
clining to extend contributory patent infringement to the sale of products capable of
noninfringing as well as infringing use. D. CHISUM, PATENTS § 1703(3) (1984). Today,
the doctrine is codified as follows:
(c) Whoever sells a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combi-
nation or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a pat-
ented process, constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the
same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an infringement
of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable
for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (1952) (emphasis added).
90. Betamax I, 480 F. Supp. at 461.
91. Id. at 464-65, 468.
92. Id. at 468.
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court's finding of fair use.93 Once again the response
was vociferous and divided.94 The circuit court accepted the
district court's findings of fact but went on to hold that, as a
matter of law, home videotaping was not fair use because it was
an "intrinsic" rather than a "productive" use of the copyrighted
material.95 The court relied heavily on Professor Seltzer's
work 96 for its analysis and definition of "intrinsic" use versus
"productive" use. Seltzer's thesis is that the history of the fair
use doctrine teaches that fair use is always the use by a second
author of a first author's work, i.e., productive use. Where a
work is copied and used for its ordinary or "intrinsic" use, in-
fringement will always be found.97 Therefore, the court rea-
93. Betamax II, 659 F.2d 963.
94. Most commentators applauding the court's decision coupled their analyses
with calls for Congress to amend the Copyright Act by providing for some sort of
compulsory licensing scheme to afford relief on an ongoing basis to copyright holders.
See, e.g., Leavens, In Defense of the Unauthorized Use: Recent Developments in De-
fending Copyright In7fringement, 44 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. No. 4, at 3 (1981); Nim-
mer, Copyright Liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispelling the Betamax Myth, 68
VA. L. REv. 1505 (1982); Comment, Copyright: No Fair Use Excuse for Sony's Home
Videorecording Infringement, 21 WASHBURN L.J. 679 (1982); Comment, Home Use of
Videotape Recorders (VTRs): Infringement or Fair Use?, 59 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 209
(1982); Note, Betamax Before the Ninth Circuit: A Definition of Fair Use for the Tech-
nology Age?, 1982 UTAH L. REV. 615; Note, Copyright: Off-the-Air Video Recording Is
An Infringement and Not Fair Use, 47 Mo. L. REV. 849 (1982); Note, Every Home
Should Have One: The Betamax as a Staple Article of Commerce in Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 16 U.C.D. L. REV. 209 (1982). Reaction against
the court's decision in the popular as well as scholarly media has been somewhat
harsh. United States Representative Stanford Parris of Virginia termed the decision
"the latest example of idiocy in the federal judiciary." FORTUNE, Feb. 1982, at 126.
Perhaps because the court failed to provide the parameters of appropriate relief for its
findings of liability and chose instead to remand to the district court to shape a rem-
edy, the popular imagination understandably focused on the prospect of people being
arrested in their homes for using their VTRs. For more informed critiques of the
court's decision, see Cole, Home Videotaping of Copyright Material Cracks in the
1976 Copyright Act?, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 215 (1982); Gordon, Fair Use as Market Fail-
ure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982); Ladd, Home Recording and Reproduction of Protected
Works, 68 A.B.A. J. 42 (1982); Comment, The Home Videotaping Controversy: Fair
Use or Fair Game?, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 363 (1983); Comment, Betamax Battle:
Round Three, 34 FED. CoM. L.J. 291 (1982); Note, Copyright Law-Who Gets the Pic-
ture?, 57 WASH. L. REV. 599 (1982); Note, Encouraging Delinquency in the American
Home: Sony's Contributory Infringement of Copyrights, 18 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 673
(1982); Note, The Threatened Future of Home Video Recorders-Universal City Stu-
dios v. Sony, 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 643 (1982).
95. Betamax II, 659 F.2d at 970-72.
96. L. SELTZER, supra note 50.
97. Id. at 24.
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soned, plaintiffs were not required to prove harm to potential
markets, although the cumulative impact of home videotaping
would tend to diminish those markets.9 The court also re-
jected the district court's analogy based on the staple article of
commerce doctrine,9 9 because VTRs were not suitable for any
substantial noninfringing use.'00 Moreover, Sony's lack of spe-
cific knowledge of infringing home videotaping was deemed in-
sufficient to excuse liability.'' Since infringing use was the
predominant use of the Betamax, Sony sufficiently "knew" of
the use to warrant a finding of contributory infringement.
10 2
On the issue of relief, the court remanded to the district
court for a determination of the appropriate remedy, i.e., statu-
tory damages, permanent injunction, or a continuing royalty.103
The court affirmed the lower court's finding of fair use by the
retail store defendants. 04 Concluding that Congress did not in-
tend to exempt home videotaping from copyright protection
0 5
and that home videotaping was not fair use, the court reversed
the district court and found Sony to be a contributory infringer
of the film and television producers' copyrights." 6
On June 15, 1982, the United States Supreme Court granted
certiorari to hear Sony's appeal from the circuit court's decision
in Betamax 1.107 The Court framed the questions presented on
appeal in narrow legal terms: does home videorecording consti-
tute copyright infringement; if so, is the sale of VTRs per se
contributory infringement; is fair use limited to productive use
and precluded from being intrinsic use; can the court impose
continuing royalties on an infringer; and by ignoring the dis-
trict court's findings of fact, did the court of appeals abuse its
discretion?'08 In a closely divided five-to-four decision, the
Court held that the sale of VTRs does not constitute contribu-
tory infringement of the producers' copyrights. °9
98. Betamax II, 659 F.2d at 974.
99. See generally supra note 73.
100. Betamax II, 659 F.2d at 975. See also supra note 73.
101. Betamax II, 659 F.2d at 975.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 976.
104. Id.
105. Compare the Supreme Court's treatment of congressional intent in Betamax
III infra text accompanying notes 110-14 and 123-36.
106. Betamax II, 659 F.2d at 977.
107. 50 U.S.L.W. 3973 (U.S. June 14, 1982).
108. Id.
109. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 796.
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Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, O'Connor, and
White joined Justice Stevens's majority opinion. Justice
Blackmun filed a dissenting opinion in which Justices Mar-
shall, Powell, and Rehnquist joined. The absence of the tradi-
tional conservative/liberal alliances in the decision suggests
that the issues of copyright protection involve something more
than predictably political orientations.
After reviewing the decisions below, Justice Stevens sur-
veyed the history of the Copyright Act and the impact of tech-
nological change upon it." Congress had specifically granted
statutory protection to various new forms of intellectual prop-
erty that had resulted from developing technology."' When in-
terpreting the Copyright Act, the judiciary has traditionally
been reluctant to expand copyright protection without prior
legislative authorization, since "Congress has the constitutional
authority and the institutional ability" to balance the compet-
ing interests created by the new technology." 2 To further un-
derline this initial reluctance to find infringement or to extend
copyright protection to home videotaping, the Court noted that
respondents were not seeking relief against all home users and
that the instant case was not a class action on behalf of all copy-
right owners who license their work to television.1"3 Therefore,
respondents had the burden of proving that specific home users
infringed upon their copyright and that Sony should be held
liable for that infringement."4 Since the Court ultimately re-
jected respondents' claims, apparently they did not meet their
burden effectively.
The Court similarly rejected the theory that Sony was a con-
tributory infringer. Respondents had cited Kalem Co. v.
Harper Brothers"5 in support of their contention that Sony was
guilty of contributory infringement. In Kalem, the producer of
an unauthorized film version of the novel Ben Hur was held
liable for contributory infringement of the author's copyright
110. Id. at 782-83.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 783 (citing Teleprompter Corp. v. CBS, 415 U.S. 394 (1974); Fortnightly
Corp. v. United Artists, 392 U.S. 390 (1968); White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v.
Apollo Co., 209 U.S. 1 (1908); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345
(Ct. Cl. 1973), affd per curiam by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975)).
113. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 785.
114. Id. Compare the Betamax I court's allocation of burden of proof supra text
accompanying note 98.
115. 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
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because he controlled the unauthorized use of the copyrighted
novel by the film company." 6 In the majority's view, the
Betamax case was distinguishable since Sony exercised no such
control over, and had no contact with, either any copyrighted
material or the putative direct infringer. Analogizing the sta-
ple article of commerce doctrine to the Betamax situation, the
Court affirmed the district court's finding that a significant
number of uses of VTRs could be noninfringing." 7 Time-shift-
ing, both authorized and unauthorized, constituted fair use,
based on an "equitable rule of reason.""18 Therefore, the sale of
VTRs, deemed to be a staple article of commerce, could not
constitute contributory infringement of the producers' copy-
rights. 9 The copyright holders failed "to demonstrate some
likelihood of harm, "120 especially where time-shifting involved
public access to the air waves.121 Although not explicitly stated,
the Court reached its decision guided by a commitment to the
first amendment right to the fullest possible public access to
information. 22
Reiterating that Congress alone has the power to define the
scope of protection afforded by copyright, 23 the Court declined
to find that Congress intended that home videotaping or the
sale of VTRs was illegal. Although Congress might want to
take a second look at the new technology and possibly amend
the Copyright Act, "it is not [the Court's] job to apply laws that
have not yet been written.' 1 24  The judgment of the court of
appeals in Betamax II was reversed, leaving in place the ruling
of the court in Betamax I that home videotaping was fair use
and that Sony was not liable as a contributory infringer under
any theory.125
Justice Blackmun's lengthy dissent helps focus the issues
that the Court had to resolve in reaching the majority decision.
Characterizing the Court's traditional deference to Congress as
116. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 786.
117. Id. at 796.
118. Id. at 795.
119. Id. at 796.
120. Id. at 795.
121. Id.
122. See I. POOL, supra note 32, for an extensive treatment of the first amendment
values at stake in the issue of government regulation of new communications media.
123. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 796 (citing Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,
406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972)).
124. Id.
125. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
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an evasion of the difficult tasks for which the courts are now
responsible under the 1976 Act, the dissent welcomed congres-
sional action to resolve correctly the issues that the Court again
proved reluctant to address. 126 After reviewing the decisions
below and the statutory history of the Copyright Act,127 the dis-
sent examined the provision of the Act which grants the copy-
right holder exclusive rights of reproduction 128 to see if the
practice of home videotaping violates the Act. 129 Aside from
specified exceptions' 30 and the fair use doctrine codified in sec-
tion 107,' s ' Justice Blackman argued that the Court should not
infer an intent to establish "a general exemption for a single
copy made for personal or private use."132 Indeed, the legisla-
tive history, coupled with the explicit exemption of specified
uses, indicated to the dissenting justices that Congress specifi-
cally considered and then rejected a special private use exemp-
tion. 3 In addition, Justice Blackmun rejected the district
court's finding that the 1976 Act contained an implied home au-
dio recording exemption, because the finding was based on an
inaccurate reading of the 1971 amendment.'3 The amendment
did not intend to sanction home recording, but rather to pro-
hibit commercial piracy of records. 3 5 Finding no implied ex-
emption for private home recording, the dissent turned to the
fair use doctrine as codified in section 107.36
126. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 796. The length and tone of the dissent suggest that
it was originally written as the majority opinion. New York Times, January 18, 1984
at D20, col.2.
127. Betamax III, 104 S. CT. at 796-800.
128. "§ 106. Exclusive rights in copyrighted works: Subject to sections 107
through 118, the owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and
to authorize any of the following: (1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or
phonorecords. . . ." 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982).
129. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 799-800.
130. 17 U.S.C. §§ 108(a) (library copies under limited conditions) and 112(a) (broad-
caster of a particular transmission under certain conditions). The dissent also ex-
amined Senate and House Reports to reach its conclusion that neither the statute nor
its legislative history supports the idea that Congress intended to create a general
exemption for single copy private use. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 800.
131. See supra note 73.
132. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 801.
133. Id. at 801-03.
134. Act of Oct. 15, 1971, 85 Stat. 391 (1971 amendment).
135. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 804-05.
136. See supra note 73. The essential difference between the majority and dissent-
ing constructions of congressional intent in the Copyright Act is reducible to a thrust
and counterthrust. Compare the majority's assertion that
[o]ne may search the Copyright Act in vain for any sign that the elected rep-
resentatives of the millions of people who watch television every day have
No. 1]
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The judicially created doctrine of fair use 137 was incorporated
into the 1976 Act to give the doctrine "statutory recognition
...[by restating] the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not
to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way.' 3  Applying Pro-
fessor Seltzer's formulation l"9 of the doctrine, Justice Black-
mun argued that only productive uses qualify as fair use, since
the doctrine provides a subsidy to a copyright holder in return
for the societal benefits accruing from an otherwise uncompen-
sated use of a scholar's or teacher's work.140 The fact that a
work may be transmitted over the airwaves without charge is
irrelevant to the copyright owner's right of exclusive control.
Although de minimus infringement may be sufficient to
maintain a cause of action, a copyright holder should have to
prove only a potential rather than an actual harm to his market
when the use is nonproductive.' 41 Plaintiff studios identified a
number of theoretical harms,' 42 and, thus, the district court
made it unlawful to copy a program for later viewing at home, or have en-
acted a flat prohibition against the sale of machines that make such copying
possible,
Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 796, with the dissent's counter-assertion that "neither the
statute nor its legislative history suggests any intent to create a general exemption for
a single copy made for personal or private use." Id. at 800-01. For the classic state-
ment on the use of conventional language in statutory construction, see Llewellyn,
Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How
Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).
137. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
138. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 806 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
66 (1976), reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5680). For further statements of
the legislative intent behind the codification of the fair use doctrine in the 1976 Act,
see S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 62 (1975); S. REP. No. 983, 93d Cong., 2d Sess.
116 (1974); H.R. REP. No. 83, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. at 32 (1967); H.R. Rep. No. 2237, 89th
Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1966).
139. See supra note 50.
140. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 809-10.
141. Id. at 809 (citing 3 M. NIMMER, THE LAw OF COPYRIGHT § 13.05[E][4][c], at 13-
84 (1982)). Professor Nimmer, it should be noted, was criticizing how the Court of
Claims reached its decision in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345
(Ct. Cl. 1973), affd per curiam by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975):
The question, then, to which the court in Williams & Wilkins should have
addressed itself is not whether the particular photocopying activities of the
defendant resulted in damages to the plaintiff, but rather whether wholesale
photocopying of plaintiff's journals by any and all libraries and similar insti-
tutions would decimate the plaintiff's potential market.
The Court of Claims addressed the first question of the particular damages to the
plaintiff in its conclusion that such use was indeed fair use. The Supreme Court,
although equally divided, affirmed the result.
142. Universal and Disney had claimed potential harm resulting from a reduced
market for movie theaters and rental or sale of prerecorded tapes and discs, reduced
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should have held that they met their burden of proof. Since
the statutory factor of potential harm143 is the proper yardstick,
two implications follow: first, an infringer cannot evade liabil-
ity by demonstrating that the copyright owner suffered no ac-
tual harm; and second, the fact that a particular market would
not be available but for the infringer's activities does not sanc-
tion exploitation of that market without compensation to the
copyright owner."' Therefore, the dissent reasoned, time-shift-
ing cannot be considered fair use since the district court had
found a substantial adverse effect on potential markets.4 5
Justice Blackmun next addressed the nonstatutory issue of
contributory infringement. 46 Surveying the case law on the
subject, he argued that a finding of contributory infringement
did not require direct contact, actual knowledge of the infringe-
ment, awareness that the activity violates copyright laws, or di-
rect causation. 47  The fact that Sony had advertised the
rerun audiences, and reduced advertising revenues, all caused by time-shifting or
librarying. Betamax I, 480 F. Supp. at 439-42. But see supra note 18.
143. The standard of potential harm is "the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1983).
144. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 810-11, (citing Iowa State Univ. Research Found.,
Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980)). The dissent's first
implication is simply a restatement of the argument rejected in Williams & Wilkins
Co. The second implication rests on the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision
cited. Reliance on Iowa State in this context is arguably misplaced, since it can be
factually distinguished from the case of home videotaping. In that case, damages were
awarded to the copyright holder of a film when approximately eight percent of a stu-
dent-produced film biography of a championship wrestler was shown on three sepa-
rate occasions on network television. The use was not considered fair use since the
broadcast was for profit and the network usurped an extremely significant market.
145. The dissent misstated the district court's findings, which were as follows:
Because this prediction of harm is based on so many assumptions and on a
system of marketing which is rapidly changing, this court is hesitant to iden-
tify "probable effects" of home-use copying. Yet even if this factor of the fair
use analysis were determined in plaintiffs' favor, it would not render the use
unfair. The other three factors, and other considerations which the court
finds relevant, must be balanced with the harm. ... The possibility that
some of plaintiffs' suggested harms will occur is neither sufficiently certain
nor adequately threatening to warrant an injunction against the corporate
defendants.
Betamax I, 480 F. Supp. at 452, 468.
146. The appropriate common law definition of contributory infringement is, "one
who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contrib-
utes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contributory' in-
fringer." Gershwin Publishing Corp. v. Columbia Artists Management, Inc., 443 F.2d
1159, 1162 (2d Cir. 1971) (citing Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc.,
392 U.S. 390, 396-97 (1968)).
147. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 813.
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Betamax as suitable for recording movies and novels adapted
for television with no visible warning that such use could con-
stitute copyright infringement meant that the infringing activ-
ity was not only foreseeable but also intended.14 Therefore
Sony "induced and materially contributed to the infringing
conduct of Betamax owners. ' 149  The dissent accepted the ap-
plicability of the staple article of commerce doctrine, but ar-
gued that a manufacturer should be relieved of liability for
contributory infringement only "if a significant portion of the
product's use is noninfringing."'50 Since the amount of home
recording that was infringing was a question of fact not deter-
mined by the district court,151 the dissent would have remanded
the case for further consideration of this factual issue. 52
Justice Blackmun's final criticism was that the Court's ap-
proach eroded the coherence of the doctrines of fair use and
contributory infringement.5 3 Specifically, the majority found
time-shifting to be fair use because some copyright holders au-
thorize taping of their programs. By suggesting that a finding
of contributory infringement would frustrate the interests of
those who could reach an audience through time-shifting, the
148. Id. (citing Betamax I, 480 F. Supp. at 436). The dissent can again be faulted for
distorting the findings of the district court. In fact, the court noted that the Betamax
operating instructions, delivered to the consumer in a sealed box along with the
machine itself, carried the following warning: "Television programs, films, videotapes
and other materials may be copyrighted. Unauthorized recording of such material
may be contrary to the provisions of the United States copyright laws." 480 F. Supp.
at 436.
149. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 813 (footnote omitted). An additional defect in the
dissent's analysis of contributory infringement is that the cases cited in support of its
thesis all occur within a commercial context in which the contributory infringer was
economically benefiting from a direct infringer who was also reaping economic bene-
fits from the infringement. See, e.g., Screen Gems-Columbia Music, Inc. v. Mark-Fi
Records, Inc., 256 F. Supp. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (the shipper of unauthorized "bootleg"
records and a record station airing advertisements for the records were deemed to
have constructive knowledge because of the low price and the manner in which the
records were marketed).
150. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 814 (emphasis in the original). See supra note 89.
151. Although the dissent characterized the Betamax I court as explicitly declining
to make findings as to the percentage of infringing versus noninfringing home record-
ing uses of the VTRs, the more accurate statement is that the parties failed to intro-
duce evidence on the issue. The district court carefully described and weighed all the
evidence on the issues it was offered: evidence of specific home-use copying by five
parties, introduced by plaintiffs, 480 F. Supp. at 436-38; and surveys conducted by both
plaintiffs and defendant in 1978 by way of telephone interviews of a combined total of
1803 individuals familiar with the usage of their household VTR, 480 F. Supp. at 438-
39. None of the data addressed the specific issue raised by the dissent.
152. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 815.
153. Id.
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dissent asserted that the majority confused the issue of liability
with the problem of shaping an appropriate remedy. 5 4 The dif-
ficulty of the latter task should not, in the dissent's view, have
prevented the proper enforcement of a copyright owner's
rights. 5 Furthermore, by finding even unauthorized time-
shifting to be fair use, the Court should have restricted applica-
tion of the doctrine to such productive use as scholarship or re-
search, as enumerated in the four statutory factors of fair
use.15 6 The dissent would have found that home taping was not
a valid use under the first factor, because no selfless "humani-
tarian impulse'"5? was involved in the "purely consumptive' '158
activity. The fact that eighty percent of the programs recorded
by Betamax owners were entertainment shows, while fair use
was developed to protect informational works, also supports
the view that time-shifting is an infringing use as measured by
the second factor. 59 Since home taping involves the duplica-
tion of a copyrighted work in its entirety, the third statutory
factor of amount used weighs against a finding of fair use. 60
Finally, application of the fourth factor's test of effect on poten-
tial markets should have resulted in granting copyright owners
a share of the new market created through the development
and sales of VTRs.'6 '
The dissent argued that the majority's formulation-that if a
product is "capable of substantial noninfringing uses,' 6 2 liabil-
ity for contributory infringement is precluded---effectively
eviscerated the concept of contributory infringement. More-
over, the dissent argued, the Court confused the issue of liabil-
ity with that of the remedy by narrowly defining contributory
infringement to protect the interests of commerce. The effect
on commerce would be relevant only if there was a possibility
154. Id. at 816.
155. Id. at 818. See text accompanying note 38, for the suggestion that the ultimate
solution to the issue may rest upon an acceptance of the impossibility of enforcement
and of the difficulties in shaping an appropriate remedy.
156. Id. at 816 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1983)).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 817.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. The dissent claimed that the mere fact that the producers could show that
the value of their copyrights would increase if they were compensated for the copies
made at home was a self-evident showing of harm sufficient to establish liability. Id.
at 817-18.
162. Id. at 818 (quoting id. at 789) (emphasis in original).
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of an injunction against Sony prohibiting the manufacture and
sale of VTRs. The question of remedy was not before the Court
and, in the dissent's opinion, it is unlikely that such a broad
injunction would ever be appropriate.'63
In conclusion, the dissent agreed with the appeals court that
the district court should fashion a remedy such as an award of
damages, continuing royalties, or even a limited injunction."8
Until Congress takes action to resolve fully the problems
presented by the Betamax litigation, Justice Blackmun be-
lieved that the Court should not avoid the hard issues by refus-
ing to apply the copyright law and established copyright
principles. 16 5
B. The Response
Two distinct approaches emerge from the avalanche of criti-
cism of and commentary about the Betamax decisions. 66 They
are distinguished by their philosophical commitment towards
either low or high protection of the copyright interest.6 7 The
most notable advocates of high protectionism are Professors
Nimmer 6 1 and Seltzer,169 both of whom were liberally cited in
Betamax I and by the dissent in Betamax III. Judge Kaplan170
and scholars Lawrence and Timberg' 7 ' represent a low protec-
tionist bias, a view arguably endorsed by the weight of the case
law as well as by the decisions in Betamax I and Betamax III.
163. Id. at 818.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 819.
166. See supra notes 79 and 94, for a representative sampling of critical and approv-
ing reactions to Betamax I and Betamax II. For the argument that Betamax III de-
parts from the traditional interpretation of the four § 107 fair use factors, as well as
for a proposed market model to determine the question of fair use, see Raskind, A
Functional Interpretation of Fair Use, J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y (1984).
167. The concepts of high and low protectionism have been best articulated in B.
KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 75-77.
168. M. NIMMER, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT (1984) is considered the definitive trea-
tise in the field. In addition to explicating the law of copyright as it is, Professor
Nimmer, in his treatise and in numerous scholarly articles, advocates high protection-
ist positions and critiques the courts and Congress for their failure to concur. See
supra note 141.
169. See L. SELTZER, supra note 50. Professor Seltzer first presented the now fa-
miliar distinction between productive and intrinsic use upon which Betamax II in
large measure based its findings of infringement.
170. B. KAPLAN, supra note 39.
171. FAIR USE AND FREE INQUIRY: COPYRIGHT LAW AND THE NEW MEDIA supra
note 36. The editors argue in favor of maximum accessibility for educational and
scholarly purposes.
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On both sides of the issue, however, most commentators have
called on Congress to amend the 1976 Act in order to clarify its
intent.172 The 1983 resolution of the American Bar Associa-
tion's Committee on Broadcasting, Sound Recordings and Per-
forming Artists of the Section of Patent, Trademark, and
Copyright Law recommends the passage of an amendment to
establish a mandatory royalty on the sale of recording equip-
ment and blank tape. 73
Congressional reaction to the Betamax case has been swift
but thus far inconclusive. Two days after the Betamax II opin-
ion was handed down, two senators introduced a bill amending
the 1976 Act by exempting private, noncommercial home vide-
otaping of copyrighted works from copyright protections. 74
The day after Betamax III, bills codifying both sides of the issue
were still before the Congress.175
Faced with the competing interests of television and motion
picture producers on the one hand, and those of the manufac-
turers of video technology on the other, Congress has, not sur-
prisingly, found it difficult to accommodate the commercial
interests of both corporate giants while at the same time pre-
serving the public's interest in unfettered access. The safest
172. Professor Kaplan, although writing before the Betamax litigation, places his
trust in common law process to resolve the hard issues that copyright law sometimes
raises. After noting with concern the recent drift towards excessive protectionism (in
his view unjustified by the policy goals of copyright), he makes the following observa-
tion that might well apply to the Betamax decisions: "That wily gentleman, common-
law process, has been carrying on with spirit in his usual patchy way. After some
wavering, he has answered sensibly the question that is to be considered a fresh sig-
nal, which is to ask what is authorship for copyright purposes." B. KAPLAN, supra
note 39, at 77 (emphasis in original).
173. Proposed Resolution 306-1 in 1983 A.B.A. SEC. OF PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND
COPYRIGHT LAW 161, 166.
RESOLVED, that the Section of Patent, Trademark and Copyright Law fa-
vors in principle the enactment of legislation amending the Copyright Act of
1976 to establish a fair mechanism in the form of a reasonable royalty on the
sale of recording equipment and blank tape for compensating copyright own-
ers whose creative works are being appropriated through home taping and to
relieve consumers who tape for private non-commercial use in their homes
from liability for copyright infringement.
The resolution passed by a vote of 19 for, with 12 against and seven abstaining.
The ABA's support of mandatory royalties was inspired by similar schemes adopted
in Austria and Germany and under consideration as of 1981 in Belgium, Denmark,
France, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 1981 A.B.A. SEC. OF PAT-
ENT, TRADEMARK AND COPYRIGHT LAW 130-31. See also supra note 51.




course is obviously to do nothing, because at least an appear-
ance of neutrality is preserved. Moreover, the vast numbers of
consumers are placated, since access to television programming
and videotape recording is maintained with no increase in costs.
The problem of how best to encourage creative activity for the
public good is still unresolved. Thus, the question remains:
who can best resolve the hard issues of copyright protection in
the face of developing technology?
IV
Can the Ultimate Solution Be Left to Congress
or the Courts Without More?
The rule of decision in this case is a matter of great conse-
quence to the country. In deciding it we must take care to
guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that
men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of
the community, may not be deprived of their just merits, and
the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the other, that the
world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress
of the arts be retarded.176
As already noted, in response to the Betamax decisions,
pieces of legislation affirming the Supreme Court's characteri-
zation of home taping as fair use, explicitly exempting the prac-
tice from infringing use, or imposing mandatory royalties on
the sale of tapes and VTRs were introduced in Congress.'77 To
date, no bill has been signed into law. Inaction, of course, will
result in a de facto acceptance of fair use. Against the back-
ground of the history of copyright law and the fair use doctrine,
the question then becomes: can or should Congress act?
176. Cary v. Longman, 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139 (K.B. 1801) (citing Lord Mansfield in
Sayre v. Moore, Y.B. East 1 Geo. 3, 361 (1785)). Lord Mansfield delivered this cele-
brated formulation of the tensions within copyright law in a case involving the use by
the defendant mapmaker of four charts published by the plaintiff in the defendant's
new combined chart, which also corrected some of the errors on the earlier charts.
The issue was unique in that the earlier cases and debates on copyright infringement
based on England's first copyright statute (Statute of Anne, 8 Anne, ch. 19 (1710)) had
dealt with works of literature exclusively. In applying the revised statute (17 Geo. 3,
ch. 57 (1777)), and using histories and dictionaries as analogies to maps, Mansfield
focused not on what had been copied, but on what had been added and improved. The
verdict absolved the defendant of liability.
177. See supra notes 58 and 173 and accompanying text.
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A. Market Failure as the Basis for the Fair Use Doctrine
Legal scholars, precisely because they have tended to eschew
model building, have often proceeded in an ad hoc way, looking
at cases and seeing what categories emerged. But this ap-
proach also affords only one view of the Cathedral.'
Professor Gordon has argued, in a thorough and complete
economic and structural analysis of the fair use doctrine, 79 that
a three-part test for fair use based on market failure as applied
in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States'80 offers a frame-
work that the courts in Betamax I and Betamax II may have
implicitly applied. The first element of the test is market fail-
ure'8 ' caused by: market barriers such as high transaction costs
and low anticipated profits;18 2 externalities, nonmonetizable in-
terests, and noncommercial activities;" 3 or anti-dissemination
motives.'4 The second element of the test balances the copy-
right owner's loss against the social value of the work in the
hands of an unauthorized user. s5 The assessment includes the
defendant's interest l86 and the probable injury to the exploita-
ble derivative work markets. 87 Then a balance is struck in
light of an implied consent analysis."8 Application of the third
element results in a finding of fair use only if there is no sub-
stantial injury to the incentives of the copyright holder. i 9
Where complete market failure has occurred, no injury to in-
centives exists to justify a denial of fair use.190 This element
measures the absolute level of damage to the copyright owner,
independent of the social benefit flowing from a finding of fair
use.
1 9 1
Applying the test to the Betamax situation, Gordon finds the
178. Calabresi & Malamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1128 (1972).
179. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of
the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
180. 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. C1. 1973), affd per curiam by an equally divided court, 420
U.S. 376 (1975).
181. Gordon, supra note 179, at 1614-15.
182. Id. at 1627-30.
183. Id. at 1630-32.
184. Id. at 1632-35.
185. Id. at 1615-18.
186. Id. at 1636-39.
187. Id. at 1639-41.
188. Id. at 1641-45.
189. Id. at 1618-22, 1645-46.
190. Id. at 1618.
191. Id. at 1619.
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first element clearly present.192 Transaction costs would be ex-
tremely high if home users had to bargain with each copyright
owner over the right to tape each individual program. More-
over, prohibitions against home taping might be impossible to
enforce. Possible market cures to this failure that might evolve
include mandatory royalties. 9 ' The questions that a court
must face include whether these cures will indeed evolve,
whether they will be practical, and what the court's proper role
should be in bringing them about.' Depending upon what fur-
ther findings are made, a court could decide the issue of fair use
either way. If a finding of liability would facilitate a market
cure, and if a finding of fair use would deprive plaintiffs of sub-
stantial revenues, fair use should not be granted. 9 ' If the mar-
ket cure were not practical, then the court should weigh
plaintiff's harm against the social benefits of fair use. If the
balance tipped in favor of defendants and no substantial injury
to plaintiff's incentives would result, fair use should be appro-
priate. If the incentives would be harmed, then liability should
be imposed. 96
Application of Professor Gordon's model to Betamax III clar-
ifies the decision. The Supreme Court in Betamax III implied
that a market cure, at least one imposed by the Court, was not
practical.'97 It further found that plaintiffs failed to meet their
burden of proof in establishing substantial harm 9 and that the
wider social benefits of accessibility outweighed any harm to
the copyright owners. 99 However, the model's utility in ana-
192. Id. at 1655.




197. "But it is not our job to apply laws that have not yet been written." Betamax
III, 104 S. Ct. at 796.
198. "[R]espondents failed to demonstrate that timeshifting would cause any likeli-
hood of non-minimal harm to the potential market for, or the value of, their copy-
righted works." Id.
199. "Sony demonstrated a significant likelihood that substantial numbers of copy-
right holders who license their works for broadcast on free television would not object
to having their broadcasts time-shifted by private viewers." Id. At least one commen-
tator has interpreted the holding in Betamax III as supporting an economic model of
the fair use doctrine, determined by weighing two factors: the social value of the chal-
lenged use versus the actual or potential commercial harm to the creator. The reason-
able use model, by contrast, focuses on the quantity of material copied as the
disposable factor in determining fair use. See generally Note, The Parody Defense to
Copyright Infringement: Productive Fair Use After Betamax, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1395
(1984).
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lyzing the fair use issue is limited. The model fails to illumi-
nate a crucial question: who best can determine the factual
issues of market failure and of substantial harm to copyright
owners?
B. Should the Courts Impose a Judicial Solution or Defer to
Congress to Develop One?
We have seen, in other words, that the tools at hand are no-
where near sufficient to the task courts feel pressed to do. Let
us add: the persistence of laws that are obviously out of phase,
which-were they common law rules-would be altered and
would only very doubtfully be enacted by a current legislature;
and the popularity of notions like that of sunset laws which are
manifestly inadequate to the job of coping with legal obsoles-
cence. The conclusion must be that the problem we face is not
being solved.2"
In Betamax III, the Supreme Court affirmed the district
court's reluctance to impose a judicially created mandatory roy-
alty scheme because no infringement was deemed to exist.20 1
The dissent suggested that, consistent with a finding of liability,
a court award of continuing royalties might be an appropriate
form of relief.20 2 On the issues of both liability and relief, pre-
200. G. CALABRESI, supra note 59, at 171 (footnote omitted).
201. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 593.
202. The dissent also suggested that some form of injunctive relief might be appro-
priate. Id. at 818. As Calabresi and Malamed make clear, "property rules" are pro-
tected by equitable relief such as an injunction, while "liability rules" are protected by
damage remedies. See supra note 178, at 1089-93. It is by no means settled that the
substitution of monetary relief in the form of court-imposed royalties (application of a
liability rule) for injunctive relief (application of a property rule) should be permitted
by copyright law. Professor Nimmer, among others, has argued in favor of applying a
liability rule. Nimmer, Copyright Liability for Audio Home Recording: Dispelling
the Betamax Myth, 68 VA. L. REV. 1505, 1530-31 (1982). Regarding the dimensions of
the problem, Professor Kaplan states:
Examining the view from the top of the hill, I find one temptation easy to
resist, and that is to sum up copyright with just the word "property" or "per-
sonality" or any one of the other essences to which scholars, foreign and do-
mestic, have been trying to reduce the subject since the time of Mansfield.
To say that copyright is "property," although a fundamentally unhistorical
statement, would not be baldy misdescriptive if one were prepared to ac-
knowledge that there is property and property, with few if any legal conse-
quences extending uniformly to all species and that in practice the lively
questions are likely to be whether certain consequences ought to attach to a
given piece of so-called property in given circumstances. In the same way we
might make do with "personality" or some other general characterization in
grand terms then seems of little value: we may as well go directly to the
policies actuating or justifying the particular determinations.
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COMM/ENT L. J.
cedent favors the majority opinion.
In White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co., 20 3 the
Court found that perforated piano rolls were not musical copies
within the statutory meaning of the copyright law but were
simply parts of mechanical devices for performing music. 20 4
The right of public performance had already been granted to
composers by the 1897 Act,20 5 and the right extended to per-
formances by player pianos. What was lacking was the right to
make the devices.
In fashioning the 1909 revision, Congress codified the holding
and granted the right to make the rolls without extending the
right of copyright to the mechanical devices themselves. 20 6 Be-
cause of fear that a recorded music monopoly would develop,20 7
Congress qualified the right by providing for the first compul-
sory licensing scheme in our copyright law. If the copyright
owner used or sanctioned the use of his copyright for recording
purposes, any person was free to do the same after paying a
royalty of two cents for each piano roll or record manufac-
tured. °8 An infringement provision 0 9 was added, and proce-
dures were developed for the filing of notices by compulsory
licensor and licensee and for payment.21 °
Aside from arguments based on precedent, is the legislature
in the best position to assess the presence of market failure and
the extent of probable harm to a copyright owner's interests?
Certainly its institutional ability to seek out facts indepen-
dently by way of investigative committees and public hearings
is substantial. Compared to the courts, which must passively
sift the evidence offered by the opposing parties and determine
the facts according to varying burdens of proof, the legislature
B. KAPLAN, supra note 39, at 74 (emphasis in original).
203. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
204. The rationale for the holding was that because the music could not be seen or
read, no copy existed. When the 1909 Act codified this holding, audio tape and
records likewise could not be copyrighted under the Act. It was not until the 1971
Sound Recording Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971), that this disabil-
ity was removed. Videotape, in contrast, was always protected as a motion picture
under the 1912 Amendment to the 1909 Act.
205. Act of Jan. 6, 1897, 54th Cong., 2d Sess., 29 Stat. 481.
206. H.R. REP. No. 2222, 60th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1909).
207. Id.
208. 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1964).
209. 17 U.S.C. § 101(e).
210. For a fuller discussion of the compulsory license and the difficulties attendant
with the legislative scheme, see A. LATMAN, THE COPYRIGHT LAW: HOWELL'S CoPY-
RIGHT LAW REVISED AND THE 1976 AcT 168-73 (1979).
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can solicit and gather on its own a wider range of data and ex-
pert opinion.2 n
On the other hand, the legislature is subject to the pressures
of special interests and temporary majority alliances that may
not always reflect the best interests of the larger society. Even
more dangerous is the situation arguably present in the
Betamax cases where two special interest corporate giants com-
pete for favored status in order to maximize their own eco-
nomic advantage. Insuring incentives for creative innovation
and dissemination for the ultimate benefit of the public could
be jeopardized by any decision favoring one corporate interest
over the other.
In the final analysis, the Supreme Court reached the only
proper and consistent decision possible. The courts are not
equipped to develop the foundation necessary to find potential
injury where the factual situation is unprecedented in technol-
ogy and in case law and where the plaintiffs themselves are un-
able to demonstrate concrete harm. On the basis of the record
developed below, and in light of the dynamics of copyright law
process and the judicial doctrine of fair use, the difficult deci-
sion in Betamax III was both sound and courageous.212 By de-
211. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
212. As Sony correctly argued in its Petition for Writ of Certiorari, the question of
fair use in the particular factual context of the Betamax litigation constitutes an issue
of fact determined by the district court in Betamax I. Although the lower court's
finding of fact would have been reversible if found to be clearly erroneous, the court
of appeals accepted the district court's findings but then incorrectly substituted its
own assumptions of fact, particularly in regard to the practice of "time-shifting." See
generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari for Petitioners Sony Corp. § 5, The Court of
Appeals Has So Far Departed from the Accepted and Usual Course of Judicial Pro-
ceedings as To Call for an Exercise of this Court's Power of Supervision (available on
LEXIS, Genfed library, Briefs file).
It is important to emphasize that, while the decision in Betamax III is laudable
from the standpoint of legal analysis, its utility in addressing the underlying problem
that led to litigation is marginal. Also, the fact that the decision was as close as it was
is reason enough not to pin too much hope on the outcome of future litigation. See
also supra note 126. Professor Goldstein made a similar point in his critique of the
photocopying issue in the closely decided Williams & Wilkins:
Every now and again a decision is rendered in which the reasoning employed
is so orthodox, yet the result reached so bizarre, that the occasion commands
special concern. . . . If hard cases make bad law, then soft ones like Wil-
liams & Wilkins Co. v. United States do not necessarily make good law ....
Goldstein, The Private Consumption of Public Goods: A Comment on Williams &
Wilkins Co. v. United States, 21 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 204, 213 (1974). In incor-
rectly criticizing the court's application of the fair use doctrine for the bizarre market
results it creates, Goldstein, however, missed seeing the possibility that the ultimate
solution to the problem rests not with judiciary but rather with the marketplace.
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ciding the issue on the basis of the existing law, the Court still
allowed Congress the option of creating a new understanding of
fair use and copyright protection, based on its ability to make a
careful assessment of the economic and technological facts at
work in the marketplace.213
V
Conclusion: In Search of a Future Market Cure
Perhaps, in working with other countries to find the necessary
solution, the United States can make up for some of its previ-
ous errors in the field of international copyright. Whatever it
does, the rest of the world will be watching.214
As the Betamax III dissent noted, Germany and Austria have
developed mandatory royalties on the sale of VTRs and record-
ing tape. 5 Undercutting the argument in support of judicially
imposing a continuing royalties scheme, however, are the facts
that first, both countries implemented their systems by legisla-
tive, not judicial action, and second, out of all the signatory na-
tions to the Berne Convention and the Universal Copyright
Convention, 6 Austria and Germany are the only nations to
date imposing mandatory royalties on home videotaping.217
Moreover, good arguments have been advanced favoring the
213. Compare a similar division of responsibility netween the legislature and the
courts in corporation law as analyzed in Chang, The Role of the State Courts After the
Model Business Corporations Act, 3 U. HAWAII L. REV. 171 (1981). Professor Chang's
analysis in many ways offers a mirror image of the fair use doctrine in copyright law.
In his view, state courts, after the adoption of the Model Business Corporation Act,
should continue to exercise their traditional common law role of formulating stan-
dards, even at the risk of disregarding statutory corporate norms, whenever equity
and necessity demand. The rationale for such a role for the courts is "the institutional
inability of the legislature to perform its usual law-making function in the area of
corporation law." Id. at 172. In a real sense, Congress, by codifying the fair use doc-
trine into the 1976 Act, endorsed a judicial function similar to this view of corporation
law in the area of copyright law. For a well reasoned argument in favor of enacting a
new statutory copyright structure reflective of the new realities created by advanced
technology, see Note, Toward a Unified Theory of Copyright Infringement for an
Advanced Technological Era, 96 HARV. L. REV. 450 (1982).
214. Ringer, supra note 61, at 1079.
215. Betamax III, 104 S. Ct. at 818 n.51.
216. See Ringer, supra note 61, for a history of these international copyright orga-
nizations. As of September 3, 1977, 70 nations had contracted with the Berne Union.
S. SHEMEL & M. KRASILOVSKY, supra note 27, at 426. As of March 31, 1978, 69 nations
were members of the Universal Copyright Convention. Circular 38a, United States
Copyright Office.
217. The German system has proven far from perfect. See Weimann, supra note
51, at 165-68.
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exemption of home taping as a matter of uniform international
copyright policy, with individual nations free to provide the
greater protection afforded by a royalty scheme.218
It is by no means certain that Congress will now act in the
face of the Supreme Court decision. Even if Congress were to
mandate royalties generated by a tax on the sale of tapes and
machines, it is not clear, especially in light of the litigation fol-
lowing the Copyright Royalty Tribunal's early decisions, 9 that
mandatory royalties are the best solution to the problem. The
additional transaction costs of the process appear to be signifi-
cant enough to warrant developing a more economical
alternative.220
Given a history of Congressional conservatism and judicial
reluctance to extend copyright protection beyond the bounds
explicitly drawn by Congress, what can be said for the future?
Whatever its precise shape, the future will continue to bring
dramatic technological development along with resulting mar-
ket adjustments. Videotape technology appears to have de-
feated videodiscs in competition with the home use market, as
evidenced by the recent RCA withdrawal of its videodisc sys-
tem from the market.22' Ironically, during the time the
Betamax cases were being litigated, Sony lost a substantial
share of the home videorecorder market to the rival VHS for-
mat machines. Even if videotaping were the danger the produ-
cers alleged, Sony represented a substantially smaller market
share of the offending technology by the conclusion of the
Betamax litigation. The commercial success within the last sev-
eral years of home video rental libraries appears to present a
significant challenge to copyright holders thus far unmet by the
218. Glover, Emerging International Copyright Laws on Off-the-Air Home and Ed-
ucational Videorecording: An Analysis, 28 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y 475, 529 (1981).
219. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Broadcasters v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 675
F.2d 367 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (the withholding and awarding of various fees by the Tribu-
nal were held reasonable, except for one retraction of an award that was held invalid
on procedural grounds); National Cable TV v. Copyright Royalty Tribunal, 689 F.2d
1077 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (Tribunal's rates neither too high nor too low, and its refusal to
adopt semiannual inflation adjustment sustained as reasonable). The Tribunal's trou-
bles, it has been suggested, began with the congressional failure to provide concrete
guidelines. See Koppany, A Methodology to Their Madness: The First Copyright Roy-
alty Tribunal and Distribution of Cable Royalty Fees, 15 BEV. HILLS B.J. 466 (1981)
(arguing objective standards rather than a vague list of factors should be developed by
the Tribunal).
220. See supra note 26.
221. Live and Learn: Sony Does it the Hard Way, Japan Times, Mar. 25, 1984.
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film industry. 2 Marketplace accommodation, in short, re-
quires a more nimble response to opportunities as they arise
than the staid tempo that the judicial arena permits.
With the proliferation of videotape machines, the factual re-
alities behind the issues of harm and remedy diverge. Arguably
producers may be able to demonstrate real harm more easily,
but any remedy, such as a prohibition of home videotaping,
short of mandatory royalties would be almost impossible to en-
force. Of course the widespread availability of the technology,
coupled with an intelligent exploitation of appropriate market
segments by the producers,223 might facilitate the development
of a negotiated solution among the market participants.
Professor Pool has argued convincingly that an effective
copyright mechanism evolves as an integrated social system, le-
gitimized by statutory authority. 4 As it keeps abreast of
changing technology, copyright in the electronic era might be
more accurately termed "service-right," since the bottleneck
for efficient monitoring and collection has migrated from re-
production via the printing press to the service function of up-
dating and maintenance of data bases. 22 5  The danger Pool
foresees in too much government regulation of the electronic
222. Because no licensing or other arrangements currently monitor these rental
libraries, a precise estimate of their number is difficult to make. Because of the "first
sale" doctrine, only initial sales of video cassettes yield the film studios any income.
Video rental stores are then free to make subsequent profits. Although the producers
have been attempting to persuade Congress to amend the Copyright Act on this point,
no action has thus far been taken. The Competition Looks On, TIME, Dec. 24, 1984.
223. See generally Turan, supra note 25. Professor Nimmer, in arguing against the
proposition that any recovery over that received from sponsors' payments theoreti-
cally creates a double payment to a copyright owner in light of the larger audiences
reached by home videotaping, suggests that the factual accuracy of the market reality
had changed by the time the Supreme Court rendered its decision in 1984. M. NIM-
MER, supra note 14, § 13.05[F], at 13-119 & 13-120. Plaintiffs' Petition for Rehearing
likewise attempted to convince the Court that dramatic technological changes and
increases in the use of VTRs since both the time of trial and the Court's decision
warranted a review of the decision. Petition for Rehearing at 8, cited in M. NIMMER,
supra note 14, at 13-120. The petition was denied. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Stu-
dios, 104 S. Ct. 1619 (1984). The fact that the marketplace still has not caught up with
the realities of fast changing technological developments both explains, as well as jus-
tifies, the Court's initial decision and its reluctance to reconsider that decision. Of the
three arenas available to the copyright holder-the marketplace, the legislature, or
the courts--the best, by virtue of its ability to respond, albeit not instantly, to techno-
logical change within the framework of commercial advantage, remains the
marketplace.
224. I. POOL, supra note 32, at 249.
225. Id. at 250.
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media is the potential loss of first amendment freedoms.2
This note has suggested that in the narrow area of protection of
copyrighted entertainment films, the interests of the general
public, as well as those of producers, will best be served
through the industry's developing market solutions to
problems created by unprecedented technological innovation.
Once developed, these solutions should be codified by Congress
and enforced by the courts. As the outcomes of the Betamax
cases and congressional inaction demonstrate, satisfactory re-
lief from any other quarter shall continue to be elusive.227
226. Id. at 251.
227. The district court's conclusion remains definitive:
Copyright law, however, does not protect authors from change or new consid-
erations in the marketing of their products. As the Supreme Court stated in
Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.: "While securing
compensation to the holders of copyright was an essential purpose of that
Act, freezing existing economic arrangements for doing so was not."
Betamax I, 480 F. Supp. at 452.
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